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Abstract. In this paper, I take three snapshots ofWittgenstein's philosophical work 
in order to jot a few notes on the issue of the continuity in his philosophy. I use 
Wittgenstein's distinction between what can be 'said' and what can only be 'shown' 
in order to highlight Wittgenstein's continual insistence that our basic relation with 
reality is seamless. I propose that Wittgenstein holds, throughout his philosophical 
career, that our thinking does not stop short of the world. In brief, I suggest that 
Wittgenstein would note that our natural history is largely what the mediaevals 
would call second nature. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), in his preface to the Philosophical 
Il1vestigations, famously admitted to "grave mistakes" in his old thought 
and expressed a desire to publish the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to-
gether with what became the Philosophical Investigations since "the latter 
could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the back-
ground of myoid way of thinking" (Wittgenstein 1967). Such an avowal 
has led to talk of "deep differences" (Hacker 1986, p. 146). between the 
two works, even if it has been noted that both are "intimatel y related" (Hacker 
1986, p. 146). It has led to the perception of a "sharp contrast" (Hacker 
200 1, p. 19), Between the two works and the description of the later opus 
as a ,,'kink' in the development of thought ... in a sense, a new subject, 
and heir to what used to be called 'philosophy'" (Hacker 2001, p. 19). In 
this paper, partly in reaction to this view that Wittgenstein fathered "pro-
foundly opposed comprehensive philosophies" (Hacker 200 1, p. 4). I would 
like to jot a few notes on the issue of the continuity in Wittgenstein's phi-
losophy. As it were, I am more impressed by the bridges between the land 
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masses that are Witlgenstein 's variolls works than overwhelmed by the gulf 
that separates them. 
ThroughoLlt Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical writings, there shines 
forth an awareness of the fact that the limits of the meaningful application 
of language have an impact on the limits of what can be known. The cen-
trality of the notion of a boundary in the Tractatus is, for instance, well 
known and oft quoted: 
[The] whole meaning [of this book] could be slimmed up somewhat as follows: 
what can be said at all can he said clearly, and whereof one cannot spealc thereof 
one mllst be silent. 
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather not to thinking, 
but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we 
should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have 
to be able to think what cannot be thought). 
The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other 
side of the limit will simply be nonsense (WitLgenstein 1955, p. 27). 
In this early work, this limit to language is largely worked out in terms of a clear 
distinction between what can be 'said' (gesagl) and what can only be 'shown' 
(gezeigt). In this sense, language can only be meaningfully (Silll1vOll) llsed 
when it expresses what is accidental; thal is, when what is saicl can be com-
pared to the world, and must be either true or false depending on whether or 
not a certain state of affairs obtains in the v.,tOrld. This commitment to the 
distinction between 'showing' and 'saying' means that what is said in 
a particular instance is dependent on a prior acceptance of logical form. 
Logical form manifests a stricllimilation on language: the sense of what is 
said, or indeed, what can be said, is utterly dependent on the acceptance of 
what can only be shown. The latter category includes logical form itself, 
ethical valuations, aesthetic judgments, statements about the T and the 
will, and so-called philosophical 'propositions' themselves. All these are 
non-accidental ancl non-scientific. One cannot explain them or seek to test 
for them through an empirical investigation. Indeed, nothing can even be 
said about them: they do not lie within the world of facts: 
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as 
it is and happens as it c10es happen. In it there is no value and if there were, it 
would be of no value. 
If there is a value which is of value, it mllst 1 ie Olltside all happening and being-
so. For all happen ing and being-so is accidental. 
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie ill the world, for otherwise this would 
again be accidental. 
It musllie outside the world (Wi1tgensrein 1955, p. 183). 
Wittgenstein held that this radical distinction between what is said and what 
could only be shown, where what can be shown cannot be said (Wittgen-
stein J 955, p. 79), ensures the clarity of logical form. Within the scope of 
what can only be shown the problems of life vanish, for such questions and 
their respective answers cannot be spoken of: they are inexpressible and, as 
such, they only show themselves, for this is the mystical (das Mystische) 
(Wittgenstein 1955, p. 187). 
One can here immediately point out two philosophically interesting ap-
plications of this approach. In the first place, Wittgenstein considers it im-
portant to recognize that explanation, that is, what one can say, must come 
to an end somewhere: 
[Pjeople stop short at natural laws as at something unassailable, as did the an-
cients at God and Fate. 
And they both are right and wrong. But the ancients were clearer, in so far as 
they recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modem system makes it ap-
peal' as if evetything were explained (Wittgenstein 1955, p. 181). 
In the second place, a related point is his conviction that the sceptical posi-
tion is meaningless. He avers that it is merely an attempt to say what cannot 
be said: 
Scepticism is 1101 irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where 
a question cannot be asked. 
For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question only where there 
is an answer, and this only where something can be said (Wittgenstein 1955, 
p. 1987). 
Although the distinction between 'saying' and 'showing' is usually associ-
ated with the Tmctatlls, it remains a fundamental theme throughout \Vit-
tgenstein's work. It is used, throughout his writing, to provide 
a philosophically illuminating picture of the structure of ollrlangllage. Even 
when other aspects of his thinking have shifted their focus or changed more 
or less radically, this distinction remains prominent. Indeed, it would be 
useful to review, in this light, one of his last collections of writings, written 
around thiny-five years after the formation of the TractatLis. 
On Certainty is the result of work done during the last year and a half of 
Wittgenstein's life. At the time, while staying with Norman Malcolm in 
I~·t 1\1'\.[ ..... ..) U L I f\ l't f\ 
Ithaca, Wittgenstein began to direct himself to writing about the epistemo-
logical questions of knowledge and certainty. His notes, the last of which are 
dated just two days before his death, constitute an unrevised manuscript 
which, while unpolished, appears remarkably accomplished both in form 
and in content (Wright 1982, p. 165). Published some eighteen years after 
his death under the title 011 Cerfainty,! tbe work comprises a three-cornered 
argument involving the author, G.E. Moore and the Cartesian sceptic. 
Indeed, Wittgenstein was stimulated to write about the subject follow-
ing his study of Moore's articles which attempted to show the trustworthi-
ness of our understanding and our knowledge of the existence of the exter-
nal world in the face of Descartes' sceptical arguments in his First and 
Third Meditations.2 In his papers, Moore (1873-1958) claims that he and 
most human beings under normal circumstances can rightly claim to know 
a good number of contingent propositions, or what he calls 'common sense' 
propositions. He maintains that this knowledge is based on some evidence 
for their truth. Indeed, in one of his papers, Moore argues that human 
beings are all "in this strange position that we do know many things, with 
regard to which we know further that we must have had evidence for them, 
I The reference to the text, which was first published in 1969 with the German 
text alongside thc English translation, as Dber Gewissheit 011 Certainly is: Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, 0/1 CertainlY, cdited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated 
by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1977. 
2 J n all fairness, it must be mentioned that \Vittgenstein became interested in the proble-
matic, as tackled by Moore, while he was sojourning with Norman Malcolm in 1949 and 
that, in his 011 CerlaiJ1ly, he takes up a number of arguments that Malcolm himself had 
formulated in his criticism of Moore's usc of the expression 'I know'. Malcolm had written 
about the question in his Delelldin,~ COlllillon Sense. (See Norman Malcolm, Defending 
Commoll Sense, in Sll/dies in lhe Philosophy of G.E. Moore, edited by E.D. Klemke, 
Quadrangle Books, Chicago 1969, pp. 200-219.) In his paper, Malcolm argued that Moore 
had used his so-called 'common sense' truths in a very different way frol1ltheir use in ordi-
nary language. Indeed, Malcolm's accllsation is that Moore had not succeeded in replying to 
the philosophical challenge of the sceptic through common sense knowledge: in his argu-
ment, Moore was guilty of the same abuse of language of which he had accused the sceptic. 
Moore later responded to this criticism in a leller addressed to Malcolm, in which he reco-
gnized the he had lIsed the expression 'I know' in unusual conditions. He insisted, however, 
that he had used the expression according to its usual meaning. In his answer, Malcolm 
asked whether one could, in fact, dissociate the circumstances or conditions of use from the 
meaning of an expression, and, after reviewing various situations in which the expression 
could be Llsed, concluded thatlhe different circumstances lead to a different meaning of the 
expression in each case. (See Patricia De Martelaere, WitlgcllSleill criliqlle de Moore, in 
RCI'lIe Philosophiljue de LOIIl'ail1. R4 (J 9R6), pp. 208·228.) 
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and yet we do not know how we know them, that is, we do not know what 
the evidence was".3 
In the same paper, he gives a number of examples of such 'common 
sense' propositions which include the assertions that he is a human being, 
that the object he is now pointing to is his hand and that the earth existed 
for many years before him. He then continues to say that such propositions 
imply philosophical propositions such as that there exists a world exterual 
to his mind.4 Indeed, while he holds that members of both classes of prop-
ositions are contingent truths, he would argue that his argument refuting 
the sceptic is untouchable: the latter could only refute 'common sense' 
propositions by adducing evidence supporting some other contingent prop-
ositions which Moore would, perhaps on second thoughts, accept. There-
fore he convincingly (or so he thought) rebutted the sceptic's argument. 
Wittgenstein thought that this rebuttal of scepticism was most captivat-
ing and original. However, most interestingly, he held that both Moore and 
the sceptic were wrong because they both misunderstood the nature of doubt, 
knowledge and certainty in various ways. Indeed, Wittgenstein, unlike 
Moore, strives not so much to refute the sceptic's conclusion as to show the 
meaninglessness of his procedure (Wittgenstein 1955, p. 187, Wittgenstein 
1977, §§ 29, 149), The challenge he puts before the methodical doubter 
takes the shape of the question: "Doesn't one need grounds for doubt?" 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 122). Indeed, one can't help feeling that some ques-
tions are not in any way legitimate: one feels that the person asking them 
has not learned to ask questions about the matter in question. The individ-
ual concerned has not learned the game. In fact one secretly hopes that the 
] G.E. Moore, A Defence a/Common Sense, in Philosophical Papers, Allen and Unwin, 
London 1959, p. 44, as quoted in, Georg H. von Wright, Wiltgensleill, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford 1982, p. 166. The paper in question was originally published in 1925. 
4 Indeed, in a later paper Proof of an Ettemal World, (in Proceedings 0/ the Brilish 
Academy, xxv, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1939, pp. 273-300), Moore held that philo-
sophical propositions such as 'there exists a world external to my mind' were not only im-
plied butprova/Jle on the basis of 'common sense' propositions. In this paper, Moore conc-
ludes that 'there exist two hands' from the premises that 'this is a hand' (referring to the left 
hand), and 'this too is a hand' (referring to the right hand). Now, according to Moore, in the 
same paper, for a proof to be valid, it must be able to satisfy three conditions: the premises 
must be different from the conclusion; the conclusion must follow from the premises; and 
the premises must be known with certainty. Now, according to Moore, the judgment that 
'this is a hand' implies such certainty in thai it is not reducible to a purely subjective convic-
tion, or to a pragmatic working hypothesis; on the contrary, such a judgment enjoys the 
status of objective knowledge. 
person asking certain questions will grow out of the habit sooner rather 
than later (Wittgenstein 1977, § 314, 315). At the same time, however, the 
temptation to be annoying gadllies by asking meaningless questions can 
prove strong: it is so difficult to begin at the beginning and nol to try to go 
further back! (Wittgenstein, 1977, § 4] 7). At all times one must remember 
that, on the one hand, if one were to try to doubt everything, one would not 
get as far as doubting anything, for the game of doubting itself presupposes 
certainty (Wirtgenstein, 1977, § 115), and, on the other hand, that "a doubt 
without an end is not even a doubt" (Wittgenstein, 1977, § 625). Outside 
such parameters, doubts would not make any sense at all. Hence, the leit-
motiv Wittgenstein takes up in this late writing is one which was already 
present in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophiclis. Both the sceptic and those 
of his opponents who take him seriously, are trying to say what cannot be 
said but only shown namely, that our language-game of doubt and cer-
tainty exists and is played as it is played, and therefore it cannot be denied 
thal there is certainty. Thus, the incoherence of the sceptic consists in the 
fact that there cannot be any attempt to present real ity except by those forms 
of thought we have; indeed, we have no others, for that is how we live. Our 
representations and our reality are already structured by those rules, which 
are themselves 'justified' by showing that the agreement exists, not by say-
ing that it does in a further rule. 
Wittgenstein's explanation of Moore's faux pas is that "Moore does not 
know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; 
regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry" 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 15 I). He notes that one is often bewitched by a word, 
for example, by the word 'know' (Wittgenstein 1977, § 435).What hap-
pened in Moore's case is an instance of a typical ailment: "We just do not 
see how very specialized the Llse of 'I know' is" (Wittgenstein 1977, § ] 1). 
Hence, as a result, the expression 'I know' gets misused" (Wittgenstein 
1977, § 6). 
For "the truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speak-
ing, all of us know, if he knows them" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 100). None of 
the examples he produces are facts that are known solely to him and not to 
everyone of liS (Wittgenstein 1977, § 462). Wittgenstein wants to say: "my 
not having been on the moon is as sure a thing for me as any grounds I could 
give for it" (Wittgenstein 1977, § Ill), " ... [a]nd isn't that what Moore 
wants to say, when he says he knows all these things? - But is his knowing 
it really what is in question, and not rather that some of these propositions 
mLlst be solid for us'?" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 112). He argues that instead of 
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'I know', Moore could well have said: 'It stands fast for me that ... ''? And 
further: 'It stanels fast for me and many others ... " (Wittgenstein, 1977, 
§ 116). "That is to say: only in such-and-such circumstances does 
a reasonable person doubt that" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 334). 
Thus, his fundamental complaints against Moore can be summarized 
into two main points. According to Wittgenstein, Moore's first mistake lay 
in his confusing logical certainty with psychological certainty (Wittgenstein 
1977, § 194,447). Wittgenstein insisted that the discussion must be con-
ducted on the logical, not the psychological, level (Finch 1975, pp. 387, 
389). This distinction is especially important. For, the use of words of the ilk 
of '1 know' or '1 am certain' may indeed be accompanied by psychological 
states or feelings. However, all these are merely accompaniments of 
'knowing' or 'being certain'; the criterion of whether or not one knows, or 
is certain, does not lie in some inner state but is shown in one's actions: 
Don't think of being certain as a mental state, a kind of feeling, or such thing. 
The important thing about celtainty is the way one behaves.' 
The accompanying feeling is of course a malter of indifference to us, and equally 
we have no need to bother about the words ,,1 am sure that" either. - What is 
important is whether they go with a difference in the practice of the language 
(Wittgenstein, 1977, § 524). 
The same can be applied to doubting. The relevant criterion, here, is the 
way one acts (Wittgenstein 1992, p. 21), not the way one might be feeling. 
Doubting consists in the ability to give reasons for questioning a proposed 
claim (Wittgenstein 1977, § 4, 154, 231, 255, 333, 334). 
Naturally, this act may vary from practice to practice in accord with the 
rules and norms of the language-game being played; each practice has its 
own internal ways or standards of being doubted and of justification. How-
ever, giving reasons always remains an act carried out within the public 
practices of a linguistic community. 
5 Ludwig Wiltgenstein, Las/ Wri/il1gs on/he Philosophy of Psychology II, edited by G.H 
von Wright and H. Nyman, translated by CG. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, Blackwell, Oxford 
1992, p. 21. (See also Ludwig Witlgenstein, Last Wrl/ings on the Philosophy (?f P,\:vchology, I, 
edited by G.H von Wright and H. Nyman, translated by CG. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, 
Blackwell, Oxford J 982, p. 891: Ludwig Wiltgenstein, Philosophical fillies/iRa/ions, transla-
ted by GEM. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1967, p, 225; Ludwig Wiltgenstein, 011 
Cerlaimy, ediled by GEM. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by Denis Paul and 
GEM. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1977, *~ 38.308). 
The second mistake committed by the English philosopher was his mis-
use of the expression '1 know'. \Vhile knowledge must have grounds, the 
knowledge Moore claims only involves doubts that are idle, senseless and 
illusory. When Moore says he knows such and slIch, he is really enumerat-
ing a lot of empirical propositions that one affirms without special testing; 
propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of 
empirical propositions in use (Wiugenstein 1977, § 136). One does not, for 
example, assert any of them as a result of investigation. One does not argue 
about them. To speak of a possible mistake in such matters would be to 
change the role of 'mistake' and 'truth' in our liVes (Wittgenstein 1977, 
§ 138). 
Knowledge of something is dilferent: when one says 'I know', one men-
tions how one knows, or at least one can do so (Wittgenstein 1977, § 484). 
One gives reasons or grounds for one's knowledge: "from [one's] utterance 
'I know ... ' it does not follow that [one] does know it ... that [one] does 
know remains to be shown" (Witlgenstein 1977, § 13, 14). A claim to knowl-
edge is different from a case of belief in that, to be vindicated, justification 
is needed (Wittgenstein 1977, § 175). Moore's 'common sense' truths have 
a peculiar function in the system of our empirical propositions; they cannot 
conceivably be doubted and therefore cannot be known except under some 
'eccentric' use of the words (Wittgenstein 1967, § 246).They constitute the 
end-points in chains of grounds but they themselves are groundless. They 
serve as evidence for other propositions, which somebody might claim to 
know, which in tLlrn can be JLIstified or rejected within our language-game; 
however, nothing there would count as evidence for them. As SLIch they 
can be understood to be senseless expressions 'on the side of truth'.6 They 
constitute certainties, rather than knowledge, where certainties cannot be 
justified within the game they form. Rather, they are applied when justifi-
cation of knowledge claims within the discourse is required. Thus: 
'Knowledge' and 'certainty' belong to different categories. They are nol two 
'mental states' like, say 'surmising' and 'being sure' ..... we are interested in 
the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making 
judgments is lo be possible al all. Or again: I am inclined to believe thalnol 
everything that has the [arm of an empirical proposition is one (Wittgenstein 
1977, § 308). 
6 This expression was emrloyed by Wittgenstein for the necessary truths of logic and 
mathematics. (See Ludwig Wiltgenslein. Remarks on/he FOl/lu!a/iolH ofMafileJl1alics, Ba-
sil BlackwelL Oxford 197R. Part 1lI, § 33.) 
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In 017 Certainty, Witlgenstein is insisting that all testing, all confimlation 
and disconfinnation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system, 
which system is not so much a more or Jess arbitrary and doubtful point of 
departure for all arguments as the element in which arguments have their life 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 105). He points aLIt the following basic distinction: 
[The] situation is thus nOllhe same for a proposition like' At this distance from 
the sun there is a planet' and 'Here is a hand' (namely my own hand). The 
second can't be called a hypotllesis (Wittgenslein 1977, § 52) .... [f]or it is not 
true that a mistake gets more and more improbable as we pass from the planet to 
my own hand. No: at some point it has ceased to be conceivable. 
This is already suggested by the following: if it were not so, it would also be 
conceivable that we should be wrong in every statement abollt physical objects; 
that any we ever make are mistaken (Wittgenstein 1977, § 54). 
Thus, the question 'How do I know ... ?' either drags out the language-game, 
or else does away with it (Wittgenstein 1977, § 370). For, when one comes 
to think of it mLlch seems to be fixed; thal is, removed from the traffic of 
enquiry so that it now gives Ollr way of looking at things and our researches 
their form: it now belongs to the seqtfolding of our thoughts (Wittgenstein 
1977, § 211). 
Wittgenstein waxes rather lyrical in depicting this core idea. He writes 
that it might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical 
propositions, were hardened, and functioned as channels for SLlch empiri-
cal propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation al-
tered with time, in thal fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became 
fluid (Wittgenstein 1977, § 96). In another passage he compares the 'prop-
ositions' that are exempt from doubt to hinges on which questions can turn, 
and in yet another rather poetic image he distinguishes between the move-
ment of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itsel f; though, 
once again, there is not a sharp division of the one from the other (Wittgen-
stein 1977, § 97). 
Thus, Moore's 'common sense' propositions have the form of experien-
tial propositions but perform the function of logical propositions or rules: 
"I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not 
only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts 
(with language)" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 401). Hence, there seem to be prop-
ositions that have the character of empirical propositions, yet whose truth 
is unassailable. By that, Wittgenstein means that, if such propositions were 
taken to be false, all one's judgments would have to be mistfllstec1. 7 It is not 
that certainty is merely a constructed point to which some things approxi-
mate more or Jess closely. It is rather that doubt gradually loses its sense 
because the language-game just is like that (Wittgenstein 1977, * 56). And 
again, it is not that logic is an empirical science but rather that the same 
proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience 
and at another as a rule of testing (Wittgenstein 1977, § 98). Thus, 
Wittgenstein distinguishes between methodological 'propositions' and prop-
ositions within a method (or between rules and empirical propositions) 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 309), although there is no sharp boundary here either 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 318), for, as he noted, one can imagine a good num-
ber of circumstances which tllrn the LIse of a 'proposition' from that of 
a rule to that of a move in one of our language-games.8 "The same proposi-
tion may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at an-
other as a rule of testing" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 98). However, the distinc-
tion is clear in one's words and deeds: " ... if I were to say 'It is my un-
shakeable conviction that etc.', this means in the present case too that I have 
not consciously arrived at the conviction by following a particular line of 
thought, but thut it is anchored in all my questions und answers, so an-
chored that I cannot touch it" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 103). Indeed, in the 
case of such convictions, it does not make sense to describe them as true or 
false for one cannot qllestion sLlch convictions. They are normative or pre-
scriptive and, as sllch, they restrict the range of possible decisions or moves. 
Beyond everything one knows or thinks about as true or false, there is 
a 'foundation' of accepted grounds without which there would be no such 
thing as knowing or conjecturing or thinking true propositions. To think of 
J See Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Cerlrlillly, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von 
Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1977, 
§ 82, 401-403. See also Ludwig Witlgenstein, Remarks 011 Colour, edited by G.E.M. An-
scombe, translated by L. McAlister and M. SchiiHe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1977, 1Tl, 
p.348. 
s (Wiltgenstein 1977, § 622). Examples, here, could abound. Thus, an architect's plan 
for a house is normative before the house is buil! and may only be descriptive afterwards. In 
this case, the role or the use of the plan would have changed. Similarly with the celebrated 
standard metre in Paris: it can be looked upontodllY as a mere stick which was taken as the 
standard metre length for some time - so that its length could now be determined descripti-
vely. When it played the role of standarcllength, however, one could maintain neither that it 
is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long. Its role in the language-game of meaSll-
ring with a l11etre~r\lle was, then, peculiar: it was a means of description, and, thus, played 
the role of being a rule or a constitutive norm (see Ludwig Willgenstein, Philosophical 
IIll'esligaliol1s, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxi'ord 1967, § 50). 
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these grouncls as known or as true would be to place them among the things 
that stand on the very 'foundation' constituted by them. It would be to view 
our 'logical receptacle' as another object within it. Thus, ,,[i]f the true is 
what is grounded, then the ground is not tme, nor yet false" (Wittgenstein 
1977, § 205). Now, this distinction between methodological 'propositions' 
and empirical propositions is very close to his position in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus; indeed, the vital difference between the two is that 
in On Certainty, the ground includes empirical (or rather, empirical-sound-
ing) propositions. 
In On Certainty, these so-called rules form a system: "It is not single 
axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and 
premises give one another l11ulLlal support" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 142). 
,,[W]l1at I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions" 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 225). They can be said to constitute a world-picture, 
a Welrbild, which is not a private possession but is bonnd up with one's 
very belonging to a community: it could be described as the common ground 
which one must share with other people in order to understand their actions 
and words and in order to come to an understanding with them in one's 
judgments.9 
In this community, " ... I did not get my picture of the world by satisfy-
ing myself of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 94). In-
deed, one never does explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast; 10 one 
can discover them subsequently 'like the axis around which a body rO-
tates'. This 'axis' is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast: it is the 
movement around it that determines its immobility (Wittgenstein 1977, 
§ 152). What stands fast is held fast by what lies about it, not because it is 
intrinsically obvious or convincing (Wittgenstein 1977, § 144). 
It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein's description of the term 'form 
of life' in his earlier writings is very similar to his characterization of the 
9 It is importanllo note that our activities are essentially propositional and the form of 
life they instantiate is essentially proposilionaltoo. (See Roger A. Shiner, "Willgenstein and 
the Foundations of Knowledge", Proceedings of the Aristotefian Society 78 (1978), p. I ()(i,) 
'" \Viltgenstein hesitates to call the process of language acquisition 'learning' and pre-
fers the term 'training' where the Inller should not be equated to animal training, or merely 
[I process where commands are combined with ostensive gestures, Rather, the trainees are 
induced into a whole form of Ii I'e where they are brought to act as other competent members 
or the community do. 
concept of 'world-picture' (or 'Welrbi/d') in Oil Certainty, where he avers 
that propositions describing a world-picture may belong to a mythology 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 95). Such propositions and practices, usages, taboos 
and rituals, therefore, would manifest the views and convictions that char-
acterize the form of life lived by a cultural community. They might contain 
traditions about the origins of the community and the genesis of the world; 
they might contain iI1lerpretntions of seasonal and biological events, sanc-
tions of political and cultural structures, exhortations to a particular type of 
religious belief, and all that underlies the life of a community. Such a world-
picture guides the behaviour and the decisions of those who hold it; it serves 
as a basis (Wittgenstein 1977, § 167), or a point of departure of a way of 
looking at the world (Wittgenstein 1977, § 205). It too, is a medley of dif-
ferent practices and language-games. As sLlch, it contains both certainties 
and knowledge claims based on them: "above all it is the substratum of all 
my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally 
subject to testing" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 162). Hence, the concept of 'world-
picture' is used largely to describe the intuitive or practical dimension of 
the community's cLlstoms and institutions, or of one's life, customs, rou-
tine, and decisions, rather than the discursive dimension which has been 
worked out rationally. Once again, one cannot explain everything: at some 
point there is always that which is taken on trust, since, as Wittgenstein 
argued, "I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one 
trusts something (I did not say 'Can trust something')" (Wittgenstein 1977, 
§ 509). For the certainties one has cannot be tested from within (he practice 
itself, but can only be shown in one's way of doing things; within the prac-
tice, one works with slIch certainties without doubting them (WiUgenstein 
1977, § 147). 
For, when one first begins to believe onyrhing, what one believes is not 
a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions: "Light dawns 
gradually over the whole" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 14]). The system of prop-
osi tions that consti tute a world-picture does not have fixed boundaries, nor 
it is homogenous; indeed it, strictly, is not even one system but an agglom-
eration of an immense number of related sub-systems each with a fluctuating 
boundary and a mixed content. There is no rigid order between them ex-
cept that some cannot (either logically or from the point of view of genetic 
development) be learned until others are already mastered: "For how can 
a child immediately doubt what it is taught? That could mean only that he 
was incapable of learning certain language-games" (Wittgenstein 1977, 
fi 283). 
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The 'system' of one's convictions cannot be described, yet one instinc-
tively 'sees' that one's convictions form a structure (Wittgenstein 1977, 
§ 102). In the language-game, one cannot say that one knows that such-
and-such are building stones: but one does know it (Wittgenstein 1977, 
§ 396). One does know that ,,[g]iving grounds, however justifying the evi-
dence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain propositions striking us 
immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our 
acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (Wittgenstein 1977, 
§ 204). The end is not an ungrounded proposition: it is an ungrounded way 
of acting (Wittgenstein 1977, § 110). At the basis of the world-picture lies 
not knowledge but praxis: "My life shows that 1 know or am certain that 
there is a chair over there... I tell a friend e.g., 'take that chair over there', 
... etc. etc." (Wittgenstein 1977, § 7). 
Thus, when giving grounds comes to an end, what remains is the fol-
lowing: "If someone asked us 'but is that true?' we might say 'yes' to him; 
and ifhe demanded grounds we might say '1 can't give you grounds, but if 
you learn more you too will think the same'" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 205). 
For one must begin to trust somewhere, that is to say: one mUst begin with 
not-doubting. And that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of 
judging (Wittgenstein 1977, § 150). TI1l1S, certain suppositions would im-
mediately strike one as being idle; nothing would follow from them, noth-
ing be explained by them they would not tie in with anything in one's life 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 117). "Thus we expunge the sentences that don't get 
LIS any further" (Wittgenstein 1977, § 33). 
At this point, ,,[o]ne wants to say 'All my experiences show that it is so'. 
But do they do that? For that proposition to which they point itself belongs to 
a particular interpretation of them. 'That I regard this proposition as certainly 
true also characterizes my interpretation of experience'" (Wiugenstein 1977, 
§ ] 45). For, experiences do not teach fundamental certainties, because they 
constitute just the ways in which one interprets these experiences. One swal-
lowed such certainties whilst one was learning various language activities. 
Ordinary certainties, therefore, are independent of experience and evidence 
at least to the extent that one would not have any fundamental experiences 
that contradict them. 
Hence, Wittgenstein interprets the fact that members within the linguis-
tic community are certain in regard to Moore-type propositions without, 
however, being able to ground that certainty as a manifestation or the pe-
culiar logical role slIch propositions play within our use of language 
(Wittgenstein J 977, § 136-138). What, at first, appear to be purely empiri-
cal propositions are, on closer examination, seen to be induhiloble in the 
sense that, in the particular case, doubt is not excluded but unintelligible. 
Once Wittgenstein's recognition of the particular logical role played by 
Moore-type propositions, within the system of empirical judgments, is high-
lighted, the structural similarity to his position in the Tractotlls becomes 
undeniable. Thus, in his earlier work he had stated thar: 
The existence of an internal properly of a possible Slate of affairs is not 
expressed by a proposition, but it, expresses itself in the proposition which 
presents that state of affairs, by an internal property of this proposition. It would 
be just as senseless to ascribe a formal properly to a proposition as to deny it the 
fonnal property (Willgenstein 1955, p. 8]). 
His claim in the, much later, On Certainty is the following: 
I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! r am sitting at his bedside, I am 
looking attentively into his face. So I don't know, lhen, that there is a sick 
man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 10). 
Here, the fact that there is a sick man lying before one shows itself in the 
things being said and done. As in the case of the Tmcrario/7 existence of an 
internal property of a possible situation, doubt has no normal place here. 
Indeed, throughout On Certainty, references to showing are frequently 
made: for instance, in cases where giving the assurance 'I know' is not 
enough, it needs to be shown that no mistake is possible (Wittgenstein 
1977, § IS). One's actions and what one says show that one is certain about 
something (Wittgenstein 1977, §§ 7, 14, 431). In the end, what people 
accept as justification is shown by the way in which they think and live 
(Wittgenstein 1977, § 325). 
Thus, that some proposition stands fast, taking up a logical role akin to 
an internal property of a situation, is a view that runs through Wittgen-
stein's philosophy, from the time of his writing the Notebooks: "Logic takes 
care of itself; all we have to do is to look and see how it does it" (Wittgenstein 
1979, p. 11). to the period when he penned On Certainty: "Am I not getting 
closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You 
must look at the practice of language, then you will see it" (Wittgenstein 
1977, § 501). In his later works, Wiltgenstein raises the same basic objec-
tion against Moore's common sense attempt to confute the scepric as he 
had, earlier, raised against Russell's 'Theory of Types' (and, also, the scep-
tical position) in his Tractatlls. The root confusion is that they are all mis-
guided attempts to say what can only be shows (Shields 1997, p. 19). 
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In one of his series of lectures, on religious belief, delivered in the slIm-
mer of 1938, in Cambridge, Wittgenstein speaks of belief,·, taking as 
a paradigm the belief in the Last Judgment (Wittgenstein 1978, pp. 55). 
Here, very interestingly, expressions of belief are seen to resemble the 
antecedent 'propositions' manifesting logical form in the Traclatus and the 
subsequent Moore-type propositions in On Certainty. Thus, 'belief' takes 
on a grammatical or logical role, whic11 cannot be asserted or denied in the 
manner in which empirical propositions can. The role of beliefs can only 
be manifested in the way in which one regulates one's life: 
Suppose someone makes Ihis the guidance for his life: believing in the Lasl 
Judgment. Whenever he does anYlhing, lhis is before his mind. In a way, how 
are we to know whether to say he believes this will happen or not'? 
Asking him is nol enough. He will probably say he has proof. 
But he has what you might call an unshakeable belief. It will show, not by 
reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating 
for all in his life. (Wiltgenstein 1978, pp. 53-54). 
Here, a belief is not a state of mind, for the strength of a belief is in no way 
analogous to the intensity of a pain (Wittgenstein 1978, p. 54). Also, the 
duration of a belief is notcomparable to the duration of a pain: one cannot 
normally give a time to one's holding a belief! 
Wittgenstein avers that holding different beliefs is akin to thinking in 
different ways, saying different things to oneself or having different pic-
tures (Wittgellstein 1978, p. 55). In such cases, that is, when persons hold-
ing different beliefs meet, the resulting controversy is different from nor-
mal controversies since sLich persons cannot contradict one another: such 
reasons look entirely different from normal reasons (Wittgenstein 1978, 
pp. 55-56). Indeed, any reasons, which could be given on either side, would 
normally be exceedingly flimsy and, in actual fact could nol serve as con-
clusive evidence: in any case, all the evidence in the world would not be 
enough for one to change one's whole life (Wittgenstein 1978, p. 57). Any-
how, if there were evidence, belief would not remain so; it would become 
something else (Wittgenslein ]978, p. 56). Thus, beliefs serve more as 
a picture which plays a certain role in one's life, where the difference, be-
tween those people for whom the picture is constantly in the foreground of 
their lives and others who do not use the picture at all, is enormous 
(Wittgenstein 1978, p. 56). One might say that a different picture means an 
entirely different kind of reasoning (Wittgenstein 1978, p. 58). The picture, 
which is a constitutive part of a form of life, manifests itself in the use one 
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makes of it or the consequences one draws from it. In an important sense, it 
is not reasonable or unreasonable (Witlgenstein 1978, p. 58). It is part of 
the grammar of the form of life (Wittgenstein 1978, p. 72). Indeed, what 
makes a proposition a belief is not the meaning of the words; empirical 
sentences and religious statements "would not just differ in respect to what 
they are about. Entirely different connections would make them into reli-
gioLls beliefs, and there can easily be imagined transitions where we wouldn't 
know for our life whether to call them religious beliefs or scientific beliefs" 
(Wittgenstein 1978, p. 58). 
These different connections are manifested in the different reactions one 
might have in a conversation: in certain cases one would say that the other 
is reasoning wrongly, that his argument is not valid; in other cases one 
would say that the other is not reasoning at all or that he is using a different 
kind of reasoning. The first case corresponds to a scenario where both in-
terlocutors hold the same picture, one could readily accuse the other of 
making a blunder, that is, a mistake in a particular system. In the second 
case the connections are different; in this scenario, one would hesitate be-
fore calling anything a blunder: a blunder "depends on further surround-
ings of it" (Wittgenstein 1978, p. 59). 
Thus, in the latter case, such beliefs have the same role as that played by 
methodological 'propositions' in 0/1 Certainty. They represent the certain-
ties manifested by the practices within a form of life, where a form of life 
shmvs, not explains, the setting within which discursive language-games 
can be practised. 
Having presented three snapshots of Wittgenstein 's philosophical work, 
in conclusion, I want to stress that this continuity in his philosophy can be 
seen in the light of his insistence that our basic relation with reality is seam-
less. For Wittgenstein, thinking does not stop short of the world; on the 
contrary, the world is thinkable. He would strongly disagree with the David-
sonian notion that our everyday experience of the world is to be understood 
as a logical or theoretical construction out of brute data. Indeed, through-
out his philosophy, Wittgenstein sees human life as already shaped by mean-
ing. He would note that our natural history is largely what the mediaevals 
would call second nature. 
For Wittgenstein, our basic relation to the world is not an interpretative 
one; rather, it is one of continuous aspect-perception. This means that the 
typical human relationship towards the world is one in which one is seeing 
something already as a particular kind of thing. As humans, we inhabit 
a Ineaningfilled sphere. We are at home with language and with people; 
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we are at home in the world, wnere such 'being at home' manifests the 
conceptual framework of certainties that illfonns our everyday dealings in 
our life. Wittgenstein strongly disagrees with the notion thal sees our basic 
relationship with reality in terms of a defacto last-ditch dualism needing to 
be overcome by a constructive philosophy of interpretatjon and theoriza-
tion. For, such an understanding would presuppose that aspect-blindness 
were the normal human state. Wittgenstein has the following to say about 
the aspect-blind person: 
Ought he to be able to see the schematic cube as a cube? It would not follow 
from that that he could not recognize it as a representation (a working drawing 
for instance) of a cube. But for him it would not jump from one aspect to 
another ... The 'aspect-blind' will have an altogether different relationship to 
pictures from oms. Aspect-blindness will be akin to the lack of a 'musical ear' 
(Wiltgenstein 1967, pp. 213-214). 
Conversely, continuous aspect-perception is shown by the way we choose 
and value words: 
How do I find the 'right' word? How do I choose among words? Without doubt 
it is sometimes as if I were comparing them by fine differences of smell: That is 
too .. , that is too ... , -this is the right one. But I do not always have to make 
judgments, give explanations; often I might only say: 'It simply isn't right yet'. 
I am dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes: 'That's it!' Sometimes 
] can say why. This is simply what searching, this is wllat finding, is like here 
(Wittgenstein 1967, p. 218). 
Once again, Wittgenstein holds that our basic relation to our language 
and, indeed, to reality - is not a matter of interpretation. Nor is our under-
standing a language a matter of simply learning its vocabulary and syntax. 
One may pass a theoretical examination in the language, yet find difficulty 
in finding one's feet with its native speakers. For one must come to encoun-
ter the habitual use of a word against a background of objects, events, per-
sons, circumstances, and discourse so that one assimilates the linguistic 
and non-linguistic background against and within which the use of the word 
is located. Given that continuolls aspect-perception is so central in his phi-
losophy, it is no surprise lo see that Wittgenstein's point is not restricted to 
the domain of language: 
The word we ought to talk about is 'appreciated'. What does appreciation con-
sist in? 
If a man goes through an endless number of patterns in a tailor's [and] says: 
'No. This is slightly 100 dark. This is slightly too loud', etc., he is what we call 
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an appreciator of material. That he is an appreciator is not shown by the inter-
jections he uses, but by the way he chooses, selects, etc. Similarly in music: 
'Does this harmonize'? No. The bass is not quite loud enough. I-!ere I just want 
something different ... ' This is what we call an appreciation. 
It is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. 
To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environ-
ment (Wittgenstein 1978, p. 7). 
Indeed, the importance of the notion of 'background' is not restricted to the 
field of aesthetics either: 
The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known 
truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or because 
he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our 
empirical judgments. 
We don't, for example, arrive at any of them as a result of investigation. 
There are, e.g., [no] historical investigations ... into whether the Earth has ex-
isted during the last hundred years. Of course, many of us have information 
about this period from our parents and grandparents: but mayn't they all be 
wrong? - 'Nonsense!' one will say. 'How should all these people be wrong?'-
But is that an argument? Is it not simply the rejection of an idea? And perhaps 
the determination of a concept? For if T speak of a possible mistake here, this 
changes the role of 'mistake' and 'truth' in our lives (Wittgenstein 1977, 
~§ 137-138). 
Indeed, this element of sureness in our language-games, and thus the cer-
tainty we manifest in our practices in our everyday life, is crucial. At the 
same time, it is interesting to note that, of all the topics that surface in 
Wittgenstein's writings, this notion of 'background' of certainties or 'world-
picture' is one of the least explored. As we have seen, throughout his phi-
losophy, Wittgenstein holds that our investigations and interactions take 
place against and within a background which has the role of a logical re-
ceptacle wherein one does not need to draw any conclusions at all and 
which serves as a criterion for attributing error, self-deception or prejudice. 
Despite this relative lack of interest: 
Discussion of diverse contexts shows Wittgenstein's abiding interest in the is-
sue of our being in the worlel. He is suggesting that there is an analogy between 
aesthetics and logic; an analogy which is not discussed often enough. The ques-
tion 'Why do we paint as we cIa'?' may have more affinity than we think with the 
question 'Why do we think as we do?' (Philips 2003, p. 145). 
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